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7 Employment in Construction 
and Distribution Industries: 
The Impact of the 
New Jobs Tax Credit 
John Bishop 
The New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) offers a tax credit of fifty percent of the 
first $4200 of wages per employee for increases in employment of more 
than two percent over the previous year. Economic theory predicts that 
such a tax credit should stimulate employment, decrease hours worked 
per week, and reduce product prices of the subsidized industries. A time 
series analysis of the construction, retailing, and wholesaling industries 
finds strong support for these hypotheses. Our results suggest that the 
NJTC was responsible for 150,000-670,000 of the more than 1-million 
increase in employment that occurred between mid-1977 and mid-1978 in 
the construction and retailing industries. Similar analysis indicates that by 
June 1978, NJTC had produced roughly a 1 percentage point reduction in 
the margin between retail and wholesale prices of commodities that saved 
consumers $1.9-$3.6 billion over the course of the previous year. 
7.1 Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of the NJTC provision of the 1977 Tax 
Reduction and Simplification Act on employment demand and pricing 
policies in the construction, trucking, wholesaling, and retail sectors of 
the economy. Employing 22.7 million workers in 1976, these industries 
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provided 26 percent of the nation's jobs and 27 percent of the hours 
worked by all persons engaged in production. 
Time series studies of employment demand have neglected these in-
dustries, despite their importance and the availability of reasonably good 
monthly data on input and output prices, wages, employment, hours 
worked, and sales or output. Wages tend to be low: average earnings in 
the retail sector are two-thirds the national average; construction earn-
ings are only slightly lower than that average, but vary greatly. A large 
share of the nation's low-earning workers is employed in these indus-
tries—in 1970,45 percent of teenagers, 21 percent of black males, and 23 
percent of women. 
Because the life of capital equipment is short and rates of labor turn-
over are high, the response of construction and distribution to changes in 
input prices induced by tax policy may be speedier than in the rest of the 
economy. NJTC places a $100,000 cap on the amount of subsidy each firm 
may receive, and one would expect the most noticeable response to it to 
occur in industries dominated by small and medium sized firms like 
construction and the distribution sector. 
The data reported here are consistent with the hypothesis that firms in 
the construction and distribution industries have responded to NJTC by 
increasing employment, of part-time workers especially, and by reducing 
prices. The point estimates of the increase in employment that the credit 
had stimulated by March 1978 generally lie in the neighborhood of 
400,000, with a band of uncertainty of ± 180,000. A 400,000-job stimulus 
is roughly one-third of the growth in employment that these industries 
were experiencing between April 1977 and April 1978. Point estimates of 
the decline in the margin between the retail price of commodities and 
manufacturers' wholesale prices suggest that by April 1978 the credit had 
reduced the consumer price index for commodities by slightly less than 
one percentage point. 
Section 7.2 outlines the problem that employment subsidies are de-
signed to address and describes the structure of the currently operating 
marginal employment incentive. Section 7.3 discusses how a firm should 
respond to such an incentive and selects three hypotheses for testing at 
the industry level. Section 7.4 describes the estimating equations and the 
methods of testing the hypotheses. Section 7.5 reviews the data and 
section 7.6 presents and discusses the results. In section 7.7, we review 
the limitations of the study and suggest some fruitful areas for research. 
7.2 Background 
Over the past six years, overall unemployment has averaged 6.8 per-
cent, nonwhite unemployment 12.2 percent, and teenage unemployment 
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17.5 percent. This discouraging unemployment record has led both eco-
nomists and politicians to search for new ways to stimulate the employ-
ment of inexperienced and disadvantaged workers. Martin Baily and 
James Tobin (1977) suggested that, by focusing the employment stimulus 
on the lower-skilled, less-experienced workers, it may be possible to 
lower the rate of unemployment at which inflation accelerates (NAIRU, 
the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment). 
One approach is to expand public service employment for young 
unskilled workers. The cost per job created, however, is high; and it is in 
any case doubtful that in the long run public service employment results 
in large net additions to total employment. An additional problem is that 
the public sector is highly skill-intensive. The proportion of workers with 
at least one year of college is twice as high in the public as in the private 
sector (45% vs. 22%). 
These difficulties have led to programs whose objective is to create 
additional jobs for unskilled and inexperienced workers in the private 
sector. WIN and JOBS are examples of programs that have attempted to 
induce the private sector to hire the disadvantaged by offering employers 
a subsidy to hire workers in their target groups. They have not, however, 
proved very effective. 
Most employers that hire target group workers for whom a subsidy is 
available neglect even to apply for the money (Hamermesh 1977), 
apparently because of the paperwork involved in applying for the sub-
sidy. A further disadvantage of this approach seems to be that the subsidy 
adheres to specific individuals. Employers may feel that eligibility for the 
subsidy signals that the job applicant is likely to be a worker of low 
productivity—leading to the paradox that the programs may in fact lower 
the subsidized worker's chances of getting a good job. 
A third approach is to subsidize employment generally. First proposed 
by Nicholas Kaldor in 1936, this approach has more recently been refined 
and analyzed by Fethke and Williamson (1977) and Kesselman, William-
son, and Berndt (1977). These analyses suggest that by paying the subsidy 
only for increases in employment over a threshold level based on a firm's 
past employment—that is, by designing a so-called marginal employment 
subsidy—it is possible to achieve rather large increases in employment at 
rather limited cost to the government. Independently, several influential 
members of Congress (Senator Lloyd Bentsen and Representatives Bar-
ber Conable and Al UUman among them) were thinking along similar 
lines and introduced bills implementing this marginal employment sub-
sidy approach. 
President Carter's January 1977 tax reduction recommendations con-
tained a nonmarginal wage bill tax credit. The House Ways and Means 
Committee substituted a marginal employment subsidy for the presi-
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dent's proposal; this, after being somewhat modified by the Senate, was 
passed and signed into law as part of the Tax Reduction and Simplifica-
tion Act of 1977. 
This law provided businesses with a tax credit against corporate or 
personal income tax liability for expansions in employment in 1977 or 
1978. 
The credit is 50 percent of the increase in each employer's wage base 
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) above 102 percent 
of that wage base in the previous year. The FUTA base for a year 
consists of wages paid up to $4,200 per employee. . . . 
The employer's deduction for wages is reduced by the amount of the 
credit. Therefore, although the maximum gross credit for each new 
employee is $2,100, the effective credit ranges from $1,806 (for a 
taxpayer in the 14-percent tax bracket) to $630 (for a taxpayer in the 
70-percent bracket). 
The total amount of the credit has four limitations: (1) the credit 
cannot be more than 50 percent of the increase in total wages paid by 
the employer for the year above 105% of the previous year, (2) the 
credit must be no more than 25% of the current year's FUTA wages, 
(3) the credit for a year cannot exceed $100,000 and (4) the credit 
cannot exceed the taxpayer's tax liability. Credits which exceed tax 
liability for a year may be carried back for 3 years and carried forward 
for 7 years. [Joint Committee on Taxation 1977] 
The requirement that the total wages paid rise by at least five percent 
was designed to ensure that NJTC was based on actual increases in 
employment rather than artificial increases in unemployment insurance 
wages (for example, an employer could increase unemployment insur-
ance wages by dividing full-time jobs into part-time or part-year jobs). 
The requirement that the credit not exceed twenty-five percent of the 
FUTA wages limited the amounts of credit that new and rapidly expand-
ing businesses could receive. (The tax credit for each newly hired hand-
icapped worker was 60% of the first $4,200 of wages paid, with no limit on 
the total amount of subsidy. This paper does not analyze the effects of the 
credit for the handicapped.) 
In 1977, its first year of operation, $2,358 billion of NJTC credits were 
claimed on a total of 614,000 tax returns. In 1978, its second and final year 
of operation, $4,513 billion of credits were claimed on a total of 1,142,000 
tax returns. Since the firm's deductions for wages must be reduced by the 
amount of the credit, revenue costs (assuming no direct effects on before-
tax profits) were approximately $1.4 billion in 1977 and $2.7 billion in 
1978. Although roughly one-third of the returns claiming a credit were 
corporate returns, two-thirds of the dollars claimed were on these re-
turns. Since the credits due to a partnership or subchapter-S corporation 
may show up on more than one individual return, the total number of 
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businesses claiming the credit in 1978 is likely to have been closer to 1 
million than 1.14 million. This would imply that approximately twenty-
eight percent of the nation's 3.5 million employers claimed the credit in 
1978. A lower-bound estimate of the number of workers whose employ-
ment received subsidy can be obtained by dividing the dollars of credit 
claimed by $2,100, the maximum credit an employer can receive for one 
worker. This calculation implies that at least 1.1 million employees were 
subsidized in 1977, and at least 2.15 million in 1978. By comparison, total 
private nonagricultural employment grew 2.8 million in 1977 and 3.6 
million in 1978. 
7.3 The Likely Impact of NJTC 
Key features of NJTC are that it is (a) a fixed proportion of earnings up 
to a rather low maximum; (b) marginal; and (c) temporary. Each of these 
features has important consequences. The first feature focuses the em-
ployment stimulus on low-wage, part-time, part-year workers, a group 
that currently suffers from very high unemployment rates. The second 
feature, that the subsidy is based on a threshold employment level 
defined by last year's employment, makes possible a high rate of subsidy 
at low cost to the treasury; it also restructures the relationship between 
the marginal and average costs of existing firms and between the average 
costs of new and existing firms. The third feature, that the subsidy expired 
at the end of 1978 and has an eligibility threshold that is updated each 
year to reflect last year's change in employment, tends to make it an 
"automatic destabilizer." 
7.3.1 Employment 
The first crucial feature of NJTC is that it is paid on only the first $4,200 
of earnings of each extra worker. Among full-time, full-year workers, 
therefore, NJTC works to the advantage of low-wage workers because 
the proportionate subsidy of their wages is greater. NJTC also tends to 
provide a proportionately larger subsidy of part-time and temporary 
employment. 
Since members of minority groups, women, and teenagers predomi-
nate in all three types of employment—low-wage, part-time, and part-
year—NJTC should, as a consequence, target the employment stimulus 
on groups that currently experience very high rates of unemployment. 
7.3.2 Price Inflation 
The impact of the marginal employment subsidy on the pricing policies 
of firms is of major importance. If the subsidy is immediately passed on to 
consumers, the employment stimulus will be larger because the lower 
price will cause an expansion in demand for real output. This once-and-
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for-all reduction in the price of output will also temporarily reduce 
inflation. How large these effects will be depends on how firms set prices. 
Tax incidence theory tells us that the size of the price reduction induced 
by the subsidy depends upon the nature of the market and the slopes 
of the demand and supply curves. If industry demand is defined as 
Pd = B + bQ for b < 0 , and the supply curve as Ps = A + aQ - S for a > 0 , 
then the impact of a subsidy S on price in a competitive industry 
is dPIdS — bl{b — a) . An industry's long-run supply curve depends on the 
average costs of production of new entrants and the incremental total 
costs of expansion by existing firms. If there are no factors specific to the 
industry (i.e., the price of factors supplied to the industry does not 
depend on that industry's output), then the long-run supply curve should 
be quite flat (a^O) . Thus, except for agriculture and mining, dPIdS 
should be closer to 1 than to zero. In the long run, shocks to demand 
should have only minor effects on price; and changes in costs of produc-
tion will be passed on to the consumer almost completely. In the long run, 
prices will behave as if they were set according to a standard markup on 
normal average costs. 
Normal average cost pricing is also a popular theory of short-run 
pricing behavior and currently predominates in certain lines of econo-
metric work on inflation (Nordhaus 1974). For competitive industries like 
retailing and services, the basis for using this theory to predict short-term 
pricing behavior is that rates of entry and exit are very high and that since 
most firms operate with substantial excess capacity, marginal costs do not 
increase as sales rise. For firms in oligopolistic industries, one of the 
primary theoretical justifications for setting prices administratively 
according to a normal average cost rule is limit price theory. According to 
this theory, prices in an oligopolistic industry are set in order to forestall 
or minimize entry of new competitors into the industry. Prices are there-
fore set below the average costs of new entrants and adjusted up or down 
as these costs change. To the extent that changes in the normal average 
costs of existing firms approximate changes in the costs of entry, normal 
average costs will be good predictors of short-term pricing behavior. 
A permanent marginal employment subsidy with a fixed threshold 
changes the relationship between the average costs of existing firms and 
the average costs of new entrants. The fact that new firms receive a 
subsidy on all their workers rather than just a few will give them a cost 
advantage, even though the subsidy per worker is half the standard 
amount. Existing firms that choose to expand by bringing out a new 
product line or opening an establishment to serve a new market will also 
have a cost advantage over firms that are already serving that market. 
Such marginal employment subsidy would cause the limit price that 
would otherwise forestall entry of a new firm to decline by substantially 
more than the average costs of existing firms. 
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New firms compete at a substantial disadvantage, because they lack an 
established reputation with customers, have inexperienced managers, 
and need to start from scratch in recruiting and training a labor force. The 
advantages that marginal employment subsidies would give new firms are 
not likely to outweigh these disadvantages completely. When the costs of 
energy, materials, and capital are taken into account, the advantage 
produced by NJTC was only four percent in manufacturing, three percent 
in retailing, and 4—8 percent in services. Relative to the current environ-
ment, a permanent NJTC with fixed threshold could be expected to 
provide an important stimulus to the formation of new firms and the 
expansion of small ones. 
A permanent marginal employment subsidy with a fixed threshold and 
no upper limit on the subsidy per firm might, therefore, reduce prices by 
more than it reduces the average costs of existing firms. It is somewhat 
more difficult to predict, however, whether the temporary and con-
strained NJTC credit of the 1977 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act 
will have a substantial impact on prices. 
The $100,000 maximum on the credit offered any one firm limits the 
size of the subsidized expansion to forty-eight workers for existing firms 
and ninety-six for new firms. The expiration date means that a new firm 
cannot plan on receiving a subsidy for more than the first two years (i.e., 
for a maximum of 192 workers). As a result, the credit will be of only 
minor help to entrants into industries with scale economies that require 
firms to employ many more than that. Almost fifty percent of all private 
wage and salary workers are in firms that employ more than five-hundred 
workers. In many cases, however, the large firms compete directly with 
small firms in certain segments of their business. NJTC should be more 
effective in such situations. Computer software, auto parts manufacture, 
and steel wholesaling and fabrication are examples of this type of indus-
try. In these markets the invigorated competition coming from small, 
fast-growing firms may compress everyone's margins and reduce the 
share of the market served by large firms. 
The fact that permanent increases in employment receive a NJTC 
subsidy only in the first year also lowers the impact of the subsidy on 
average costs of production over a ten-year horizon. This feature will 
limit the credit's effect in lowering the entry-forestalling price. It also 
means, however, that the potential entrant can be sure he will get the 
credit even if his attempt at entry fails. If he fails to make profits, the 
credit (which can be carried forward for 7 years) is still worth something 
to potential purchasers of business. 
7.3.3 The Hypotheses 
The list of ways in which we might expect NJTC to change firm 
behavior is quite long. Work that used to be contracted out, such as 
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cleaning, maintenance, accounting, etc., might be done internally. If 
deferred maintenance can be done by new hiring of additional workers, 
we would expect it to be completed before January 1979. Where manu-
facturing firms have low wages and high turnover, there might be a 
build-up of the inventory of finished goods. Large firms that are no longer 
subsidized on the margin by NJTG might contract work out to firms that 
are eligible for NJTC; the negotiated price for that work would, as a 
result, be lower. Groups of workers that were avoided because of their 
high turnover rates might now become especially desirable. 
In the empirical work of this chapter, however, only three hypotheses 
will be examined: 
1. Employment will rise 
2. Hours worked per week will fall 
3. Prices will fall 
Behavior will change only if the firm is aware of the subsidy and can 
increase its tax credit by increasing employment. Small firms tend to be 
unaware of the credit (only 30 percent of firms with 1-10 employees had 
heard of it by February 1978). Firms with over 2,000 employees will 
generally have hit the $100,000 cap without having to change their 
behavior. Consequently industries dominated by medium-sized firms 
should respond more than industries composed wholly of either small or 
large firms. 
7.3.4 Other Studies of the Impact of NJTC 
Two other studies have found evidence that is consistent with the 
hypothesis that NJTC had a substantial impact on employment in 1977 
and 1978, and that the tax revenue lost per job created was under $5,000. 
The first study (McKevitt 1978) is based on a mail questionnaire survey 
of a sample of the membership of the National Federation for Indepen-
dent Businesses (NFIB). The first survey to ask questions about NJTC 
was conducted in January 1978. Of the employers responding, 43% knew 
about NJTC and 1.4% reported that the credit had influenced them to 
hire extra workers (the number averaged 2.0 per firm). The April survey 
found that 51% knew of NJTC's existence and that 2.4% had increased 
hiring by an average of 2,3 employees as a result. In the July 1978 survey, 
58% were aware of the credit and 4.1% of the firms reported that they 
had increased hiring as a result. An increase in employment of 2.3 
employees by over 4% of all employers is not a small response. If the 
NFIB survey is representative, and other firms are not hurt by the 
expansion of subsidized firms, these responses imply that in the second 
quarter of 1978 there were more than 300,000 extra jobs directly created 
as a result of NJTC at a tax expenditures of roughly $6,500 for each job 
created. The NFIB firms seem to be more aware of the credit's existence, 
but not to be more likely to respond that they are increasing employment 
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because of the credit. A Bureau of the Census survey of a stratified 
random sample of firms found that, in February 1978, 2.4% of firms 
reported being aware of the credit and making a conscious effort to 
increase employment because of it. This contrasts with NIFB's findings of 
a 1.4% response the previous month and a 2.4% response two months 
later. Thus the census survey indicates that, if anything, the NFIB survey 
is a conservative indicator of employer response to NJTC. 
Another study (Perloff and Wachter 1978) is based upon the survey 
conducted by the Bureau of the Census. Perloff and Wachter compared 
rates of employment growth between 1976 and 1977 for firms that knew 
about the credit and those that did not. Holding employment size, class, 
region, form of organization, type of industry, and the growth rate of 
sales constant, they found that the employment of firms that had heard of 
the credit before February 1978 had grown three percent faster. Firms 
that reported they made a conscious effort to expand employment be-
cause of the credit grew nine percent faster than firms that knew about the 
credit but did not report making any special effort. If one were to assume 
that NJTC caused the three percent higher growth of the small and 
medium-sized firms that knew about the credit (about a quarter of total 
employment is in these firms) and left the rest of the economy unaffected, 
the total number of extra jobs in 1977 would be roughly 700,000. Tax 
expenditure per job created would be $2,000 per job. Since NJTC had not 
passed Congress until almost half the year had passed, effects of this 
magnitude for 1977 are large indeed. Perloff and Wachter pointed out 
that some firms may learn about the credit because they are growing fast 
or because they are generally more aware of opportunities to expand 
their business. Consequently, they suggest that their results should be 
viewed "as an upper bound on the short-run impact of this program." 
Studies like those just reviewed are measuring the differential impact 
of NJTC across firms, not the net impact of NJTC on the total economy. 
If NJTC is to have any impact on total employment, it must first change 
the employment level of individual firms. These two studies provide some 
support for the hypothesis that firms did change their behavior because of 
NJTC. However, since firms compete with each other in both labor and 
product markets, the increases of employment in subsidized firms may 
cause decreases of employment in their unsubsidized competitors. Alter-
natively an NJTC-induced expansion by one firm may cause that firm's 
suppliers to expand as well. The direction of NJTC's impact on nonsubsi-
dized firms cannot be signed a priori, for it depends upon the relative size 
of offsetting effects. We suspect, however, that the first effect is larger 
than the second. If so, simple extrapolations from measured impact on 
firms to impacts on the economy will exaggerate the true impact. Most of 
the displacement effects that may bias estimates of net job creations when 
the firms are the unit of observation are netted out when the industry is 
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the unit of observation. A study that uses aggregate industry data to test 
for the impacts of NJTC would seem to have an important contribution to 
make. 
7.4 Specifications of the Model 
In a world of perfect information, no inventory, and zero adjustment 
costs, optimal levels of employment and hours depend solely on current 
prices and sales. In a world of imperfect information, inventory holding, 
and adjustment costs, the firm's optimal employment and hours in period 
t depends upon the realized level of employment in period t - 1 and upon 




£r- l ) 
where 5, W, P, and Q denote sales, wages, output prices, and input prices 
respectively, and the e superscript denotes a vector of anticipations of 
future values, based on all information available up to time t. 
When the observable lagged values of 5, W, P, and Q are used in an 
estimating equation, lag distributions will vary, not only because adjust-
ments to different stimuli take different amounts of time but also because 
the expectation formation process for each variable will have different lag 
structures. 
Since the information set used to predict future values of a particular 
variable may include other variables in the model, coefficients on lagged 
values of sales or wages may not follow a regular pattern. The primary 
objective of this study is to obtain unbiased measures of NJTC's impact 
on employment and prices. Imposing regularity conditions on the lag 
structure might bias our estimates of the NJTC's effect. Consequently, 
estimating techniques are employed that produce free estimates of the lag 
structure. 
Since Et-1? £ ,,_2,. . . , etc., are themselves a function of lagged values 
of 5, W, P, and Q, we may substitute the lagged dependent variable out of 
the equation. Since expectations about P may be formed very differently 
from expectations about W and Q, the most general way to write our 
equation in terms of observable, contemporaneous, and lagged values is 
(2) Et=f(S, W,P,Q)eut 
where S,W,P,Q denote vectors containing current and lagged values of 
the variable. 
Econometric studies of labor demand often estimate their models 
under some rather strong maintained hypotheses, many of which have 
recently received severe criticism. Clark and Freeman (1977) find that for 
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manufacturing, the data reject the constraint that the rental cost of 
capital and real wage rates has equal but opposite effects on employment 
demand. Constraints requiring identical lag structures across variables 
have also been found to be inconsistent with the data (Sims 1972 1974; 
Clark and Freeman 1977). 
Estimates of systems of demand equations that have included materials 
and energy inputs typically reject the weak separability of materials and 
energy from capital and labor (Berndt and Wood 1975; Gollop 1974). 
This rejection implies that the correct specification of a labor demand 
function contains the prices of materials and energy. Since the prices of 
materials may be correlated with the cost of capital or wage rates, 
estimates of labor demand functions derived from a value-added produc-
tion specification are likely to be biased. 
A number of other potentially troublesome maintained hypotheses, 
relating to the exogeneity of industry sales and wage rates in regressions 
predicting employment, will be tested. Sims (1972) has shown that, under 
fairly general conditions, a test of the hypothesis that coefficients on 
future values of the wage rate or on sales are all zero can be regarded as a 
test of the hypothesis that the equation is in fact structural. Rejection of 
this hypothesis will be taken as evidence for simultaneity, and the equa-
tion will be reestimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Potential 
exogeneity problems with the price of output are eliminated by treating P 
as a function of nominal input prices and solving P out of the model. 
Our models were estimated under two alternative sets of maintained 
hypotheses. The relative wage model assumes that the information set 
used in generating expectations about future input price ratios is limited 
to current and lagged information about input price ratios. This specifica-
tion implies that a simultaneous five percent increase in all input prices 
will leave current arid all future employment levels unchanged. Although 
the tests for exogeneity that were applied to this model were rejected for 
some industries, there was no attempt to apply 2SLS using this model, 
because to do so would have involved simultaneously instrumenting all 
input prices. 
The second, somewhat more general, specification is the nominal input 
price model. Using nominal input prices rather than price ratios as 
regressors means that we are dropping the assumption that the informa-
tion set is limited to input price ratios. Firms are certainly aware of the 
history of nominal prices. Rational behavior implies that expectation 
formation takes into account the noise-to-signal ratio of a series, and this, 
in turn, implies that the time pattern of response to each nominal input 
price should be estimated separately. In this model we choose not to 
impose the constraint that the coefficients on input prices sum to zero, 
because errors in measurement of the rental price of capital and of price 
indexes for consumable materials and business services are likely to be 
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larger than errors in measurement of wholesale prices and wage rates 
(especially in the disaggregated retail industry models). Imposing this 
constraint would increase the likelihood of transmission of a bias arising 
from an error in variables to the wage coefficients. (Clark and Freeman 
1977 demonstrate this for simple cases.) If we are wrong, and the con-
straint should have been imposed, we lose efficiency only. 
All the variables in these models except for seasonal dummies, time 
trends, and NJTC are expressed as logarithms. The estimating form of 
the relative wage model is: 
£ = p 0 + p 1 r + M p 2 + rMp3+P4NJTC + 51p5 + S2p6 
+ (e -W)p 7 + (/?-W)p8 + p 9 ( ^ - W ) + e 
The estimating form of nominal price model is: 
E = Oo+ atT+Ma2 + TMa3 + a4 NJTC + S&s + Sja* 
T=a time trend 
M = a vector of monthly seasonal dummies 
rM = time trends on the seasonal dummies 
NJTC = measure of knowledge of NJTC 
Sx = a row vector of current and lagged measures of output 
for the entire industry 
S2 = a row vector of current and lagged measures of the 
subindustry's output 
W= a row vector of current and lagged hourly rates of com-
pensation in the industries 
Q = a row vector of current and lagged prices of the indus-
try's intermediate inputs 
R — a row vector of current and lagged rental costs of capital 
specific to the industry 
Pk ~ W= a three-year average of the ratio of capital goods prices 
to wage rates 
The basic model assumes that anticipations of present and future values 
of sales and prices are based on the previous three-year record of these 
variables. The sales, wage rate, and intermediate input price variables are 
represented by their current value, with averages for the previous four 
quarters and half-yearly averages going a further two years back in time.1 
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Cost of capital is represented by four variables: an average for the 
previous twelve months and this same variable lagged one, two, and three 
years.2 
7.5 Data 
For the construction industry, the output variable is construction put in 
place, deflated by an interpolated National Income Accounts (NIA) 
deflator for structures. For the retail industry, aggregate output is defined 
as retail sales, deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) for commod-
ities. Industry-specific output measures for the disaggregated segments of 
the retail industry are retail sales for that segment of the industry deflated 
by the appropriate components of the CPI. For trucking, the output 
variable is a seasonally adjusted index of the volume of general freight 
hauled by class 1 and 2 common carriers of property. For wholesaling, we 
use the sales of merchant wholesalers deflated by the CPI for commod-
ities. For trucking and wholesaling, only partial coverage of the industries 
is provided by these indexes, and the data on employment and hours and 
those on retail or wholesale sales are obtained from separate samples of 
firms. When industry subaggregates are being used, sampling error in the 
industry-specific sales variable can become a serious problem. Conse-
quently, models predicting employment in trucking, wholesaling and 
disaggregate retail industries contain the additional scale variable of 
current and lagged total retail sales. 
Indexes of the rental cost of capital services in the construction, truck-
ing, and retail industries were calculated. The appendix details our data 
sources and assumptions. The main features of the resulting calculations 
are summarized in table 7.1. In the first three rows are tabulated present 
values (at a 10% discount rate) of the depreciation deductions allowed on 
equipment used by retail firms. Note that these present values have 
increased (from 41.70 to 720 per dollar invested) as tax lives have shor-
tened. The liberalization of depreciation rules and the investment tax 
credit have lowered the rental on capital goods (rows 4-7). For retail 
corporations the rental cost of equipment fell from .278 in 1950 to .224 in 
1978. Corporate rental costs for trucks fell from .44 in 1950 to .373 in 
1978. Rentals in 1978 are almost equal to those that would prevail if there 
was no taxation of business income or complete expensing of all invest-
ment costs in the first year (compare the first and last columns of rows 
4-7).3 
The retail industry's compensation per hour of work has risen in 
current dollars to 4.7 times its level in 1950 (see bottom row). The price of 
other inputs has not been rising quite as rapidly so their relative cost has 
been declining. An index of the relative rise in labor costs (the log of the 
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rows 8-11. Relative to the wholesale price of consumer finished goods, 
wages had risen in 1972 to 2.1 (antilog .731) times their 1950 level. The 
price explosion following the Yom Kippur War, however, lowered real 
wages by nearly twelve percent in three years to 1.84 times their 1950 
level. Since then, real wage rates have recovered somewhat to 2.02 times 
their 1950 level. Relative to the price of business services and consumable 
materials or to the price of capital equipment, wages have risen much less 
dramatically. Between 1950 and 1978 wage rates rose only twenty-three 
percent faster than an index of plant and equipment prices. The in-
creasingly favorable tax treatment of capital investment has meant, 
however, that the price of efficiency units of capital services has lagged 
behind the prices of the equipment and buildings that provide those 
services. As a result, wage rates (the price of labor services) have doubled 
relative to the price of capital services. 
Most studies of the effect of tax incentives on firm behavior assume that 
factor demand responds to the after-tax cost of the variable. Studies of 
investment incentives imbed a multiplicity of tax provisions in a single 
variable for the rental cost of capital. To construct this cost of capital 
variable, assumptions must be made about (1) the appropriate market 
interest rate; (2) how expectations of output and capital goods prices are 
formed; (3) the level and timing of knowledge of tax incentive provisions; 
and (4) the nature of the firm's expectations about changes in tax provi-
sions. Inferences about the effect of specific tax provisions are based on 
the role the tax provision has in determining rental cost and the magni-
tude and significance of the rental cost variable. The inevitable errors in 
constructing the rental cost variable bias both the coefficient on rental 
cost and the policy simulations that are derived from that coefficient. 
Studies applying this methodology to labor demand attempt to measure 
the wage elasticity of employment. Hamermesh (1976) has recently re-
viewed these studies and predicts that a marginal wage subsidy of NJTC's 
generosity would have a substantial impact upon employment. The 
assumptions necessary to draw such an inference are considerable, 
however: (1) Employers must know of NJTC's existence and provisions 
and believe the credit will not be extended beyond 1978. (2) Employers 
cannot be subject to income effects, for the income effects of wage rate 
changes and a marginal wage subsidy are very different. (3) Elasticities 
based on historical responses to anticipated and permanent changes in 
before-tax wage rates must correctly predict the response to an unantici-
pated temporary change in a tax provision. Policy simulations of this kind 
are useful (Bishop and Lerman 1977); Hamermesh 1977), but they can-
not be conclusive. 
Where it is feasible, direct measurement of the effects of a tax provi-
sion is to be preferred. This is what we propose to do in this paper. Since 
our primary purpose here is to provide a powerful test of the effects of 
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NJTC, the specification of this variable is important. The effect of the tax 
credit is likely to be very different from the effect of an equivalent change 
in the wage rate. NJTC is capped, temporary, and marginal; it requires 
that the firm have tax liability if it is to receive benefits. In February 1978, 
more than half of all firms were unaware that the credit existed, and many 
of those that had heard of it wrongly thought themselves to be ineligible. 
In February 1978, a census bureau survey asked a large sample of firms 
whether they had heard of the tax credit and, if so, when they had heard 
of it. Large firms were much more likely to have heard of the credit and to 
have heard of it immediately after its passage in May 1977. Using a 
distribution of retail employment categorized by size of firm, we esti-
mated the proportion of retail employees that were in firms that knew 
about the credit for each month of 1977 and 1978. (Firms employing more 
than a thousand workers were excluded from this calculation.) 
It was assumed that once a firm knows about the credit its response will 
be distributed over the following six months. The NJTC variable is, 
therefore, an average over the past six months of the proportion of firms 
(weighted by employees) that knew about the credit. The firms that 
reported hearing of the credit before it was passed were assumed to have 
waited until passage before responding. Defining the NJTC variable in 
this way means that, although the House passed a bill with the credit in 
early March, we are assuming that anticipation of that credit was not 
responsible for any part of the spring 1977 upswing in employment. 
The NJTC variable had a value of .057 in June 1977, and rose at an 
average rate of .0424 per month. By March 1978 it had achieved the value 
of .435. In June 1978 its value was .572. Multiplying the coefficient on 
NJTC by .435 provides our estimate of the credit impact on the March 
1978 value of a dependent variable. Note that this specification implies an 
assumption that almost the entire impact of the credit on the average 
level of employment will occur in 1978 rather than 1977, although in fact 
it might have had important impacts on the level of employment in 
November and December 1977. 
7.6 Results 
7.6.1 Employment Models 
Relative input price model regressions using three-year-distributed 
lags on sales, wages, the rental rate on capital, and materials input prices 
are presented in table 7.2. Corresponding nominal input price model 
regressions are presented in table 7.4. The two-state least-squares results 
for construction and retail aggregates are presented in table 7.5. All the 
results reported are for models estimated with data transformed to cor-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.2 (continued) 




Sales I n d- R e t -
Sales Sales 
NJTC 1Q 1 Yr 2 Yr Total Inputs Rate Price 1Q 1 Yr 3 Yr 3 Yr ve p DW 




.122** .167 .084 -.412 -.488 -.315 +0.702 .568 .1624 .37 .597 -.23 .003 .28 1.89 
(.026) 
Wholesale .007 -.088 -.149 -.417 -.296 +.346 -.228 -.445 .126 .303 -.019 .275 .0031 .715 1.51 
(52-78:03) (.021) 
Construction est. .230** -.283 -.128 -.321 +.285 +.224 -.674 
(52-78:03) (.082) 
.254 .355 .176 0 .0154 .789 1.71 
Note: All input prices are entered as ratios to the wage. This imposes the constraint that an equal percentage change in all input prices leaves employment 
levels in all future periods unchanged. The lag structures on all variables go back 3 years. 
Columns 2-5 are the negative sum of the coefficients on the wage rate variables starting with the contemporaneous coefficients and including all lags back to 
the indicated one. 
Columns 6-8 are the sum over the full three-year period of the lag structure of the coefficients on other input prices—wholesale prices of goods sold, rental 
cost of capital, and the price index for plant and equipment. 
Columns 9-10 sum the coefficients on both sales variables—subindustry retail sales and total retail sales—starting with the contemporaneous coefficients 
and including all lags back to the indicated one. 
Columns 11 and 12 are the sum of the full three-year period of the coefficients on subindustry sales and total sales, respectively. 
The standard error appears in parentheses under the NJTC coefficient. 
Significant levels * .05 ssp s= 0.1 * * .01 ^p. 
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Table 7.3 The Impact of NJTC on Employment under Alternative 
Specifications of the Relative Wage Model 




Period (000) 3-Yr Lag 2-Yr Lag 1.5-YrLag 




















Constr. (estab. data) 
/-value 
Increase in employment 























































































Note: Derivation of these series is described in the appendix. Underneath the coefficient is 
first the /-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no effect and then the standard error of 
the regression (in parenthesis). 
Table 7.4 Employment in Construction and Distribution Industries: Nominal Input Price Models with 3-Year Lags 
NJTC 
Rental Total 
Mate- Cost of Sales Inc*- Ret« 
rials Plant & Sales Sales 
IQ 1YR 2YR Total Price Equipment IQ 1 Yr 3 Yr 3 Yr CTC 




























-.230 .701 .237 -.638 1.162 -.235 
-.795 -.583 .700 .092 .623 -.143 
.187 .475 .402 -.171 .343 -.159 
.122 -.447 -.580 .054 .526 -.218 
-.005 -.339 -.126 -.106 .497 -.116 
.095 -.590 -.780 -.653 .728 .019 
.183 -.070 -,400 -.665 .014 .538 
.531 .745 .947 
.274 .741 1.017 




.387 .605 -.515 1.275 .0060 
.091 .414 .506 .206 .0046 
.318 .406 .007 .900 .0140 








Table 7.4 (continued) 
Sum of Coefficients on 
Hourly Compensation 
Rental 
Mate- Cost of 
rials Plant & 











-.337 -.296 -.151 -.344 .390 .379 .615 1.020 -.126 .0092 .575 2.09 













.122 -.447 -.580 .054 .526 -.218 
-.005 -.339 -.126 -.106 .497 -.116 
-.095 -.590 -.780 -.653 .728 .019 
.183 -.070 -.400 -.665 .014 .538 
.387 .605 -.515 1.275 .0060 .584 1.54 
.091 .414 .506 .206 .0046 .616 1.89 
.318 .406 .007 .900 .0140 .387 2.04 
.212 .605 .267 .915 .0041 .663 1.73 
^^Bsm^^^^n^ey^ ^m^ ^i£i^mmmMs 'i^tiuti^'&b&fa&M 
Table 7.4 (continued) 
NJTC 1Q 
Sum of Coefficients on 
Hourly Compensation 



























.163 -.337 -.296 -.151 -.344 .390 
.037 .078 .476 -.355 .142 .185 
.165 .143 .174 .089 .135 -.200 
-.317 -.200 .097 .085 -.533 .223 
.379 .615 1.020 -.126 .0092 .575 2.09 
.173 .474 -.487 1.668 .0036 .510 1.49 
.147 .324 .203 .273 .0032 .774 1.49 
.377 .523 .984 -.514 .0072 .408 1.83 
Note: Columns 2-5 are the sum of coefficients on the wage rate starting with the contemporaneous coefficients and including all lags back to the indicated 
one, i.e., lQ = a, + a_! 
Columns 6-7 are the sum over the full three-year period of the coefficients in other input prices. Derivation of rental cost of capital is described in appendix. 
Columns 8 and 9 sum the coefficients on both sales variables back to the indicated lag. 
Columns 10 and 11 are the sum for the full three-year period of the coefficients on subindustry sales and total sales, respectively. 
Significant levels * .05s=p>.01 ** .01>/? 
Table 7.5 Comparison of Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) Models of Employment, 






1 YR 2 YR Total Price 
Cap- Sales I n d -
ital Sales 
























.744 - .114 .59 -.477 .672 
.230 .701 .237 - .638 1.162 
.100 .99 .009 - .701 1.273 
.371 1.089 .369 - .351 .518 
- .944 1.133 .259 - .614 1.064 
.330 1.283 .241 - .800 1.235 
.075 .521 .767 .799 .0251 .722 1.89 
.235 .531 .745 .947 .0143 .818 1.98 
.283 .598 .891 1.068 .0280 .580 2.17 
.039 .485 .677 .659 .0265 .668 1.70 
.196 .556 .771 .959 .0148 .820 1.89 
.206 .591 .977 1.140 .0287 .601 2.14 
f^yys-^'*** 




1 Y R 2 Y R Total Price 
Capt-
ital 
Rent 1Q 1 YR 3 YR 
























.100 .99 .009 - .701 1.273 
.371 1.089 .369 - .351 .518 
- .944 1.133 .259 - .614 1.064 
.330 1.283 .241 - .800 1.235 
.283 .598 .891 1.068 .U28U .S8U Z.l/ 
.039 .485 .677 .659 .0265 .668 1.70 
- .196 .556 .771 .959 .0148 .820 1.89 
.206 .591 .977 1.140 .0287 .601 2.14 
^mw%f^^^^^mi^^^-^^^^^ #-**!*£>>". *> ^v*. • 
Table 7.5 (continued) 
Wage 
NJTC 1Q 1 YR 
Mate- Capt-
rial ital 
2 Y R Total Price Rent 
Sales Ind. 
Sales 

















- .795 - .583 .118 - .490 .622 
.187 .476 .407 .288 .342 
-1.200 - .706 .115 - .491 .691 
.094 .415 .390 - .164 .364 
.016 .274 .743 1.019 .0122 .657 2.00 
.159 .287 .516 .778 .0043 .845 2.24 
-1.96 .298 .751 1.050 .0123 .657 2.01 
- .170 .29 .518 .792 .0043 .846 2.26 
Note: Derivation of these series is described in the appendix. 
Double 2SLS involves applying two-stage least squares to the data twice. In the first application we assume that w at all lags is endogenous. This produces a 
consistent estimator of p which is used to transform the data. 2SLS is then applied to the data a second time, assuming only the current w endogenous. 
Significance levels ** .01 >p * . 0 5 > p > . 0 1 
Table 7.6 Impact of New Jobs Tax Credit on Employment in the Nominal Input Price Model 
Industry 
Construction (household) data 
/-value 
(*.) 
Construction (estab. data) 
/-value 
(*«) 
Retail and wholesale (household data) 
/-value 
(*.) 
Retail (estab. data) 
/-value 
w 





















































































































































Retail (estab. data) 
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4,021 Other retail 
/-value 
Wholesaling 51:02-78:03 4,389 
/-value 
Trucking 58:02-78:03 1,131 
/-value 
Life insurance 61:02-78:03 519 
/-value 
Increase in Employment by March 1978 in Construction and Distribution (000) 
Using detailed indust. model 
Using estab. data aggregates 
































































Note: Derivation of these series is described in the appendix. 
All models were estimated with the same p correction. Underneath the coefficient on NJTC is first the /-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no effect 
and then the standard error of the regression (in parentheses). 
Significance levels ** .01 > p * .05>p>.01 t .10>p>.05 
234 John Bishop 
the data is presented in the second to last column of the tables. The 
Durbin Watson statistic is for the regression using the transformed data 
and is therefore a test for second-order serial correlation of the residuals. 
The elasticity of employment with respect to sales is indicated in 
columns 9-12 of table 7.2, columns 8-11 of table 7.4, and columns 8-10 of 
table 7.5. The elasticity of employment with respect to changes in wage 
rates or input prices is presented in columns 2-8 of table 7.2 and columns 
2-7 of tables 7.4 and 7.5. The response of employment to a change in an 
input price depends on how long a time there has been to react. The 
elasticity of response after a change has been maintained for three 
months is given by the column headed 1Q. The responses after 1,2, and 3 
years are given respectively in columns 3,4, and 5 of table 7.2. Note that 
with a freely estimated lag structure, the high degree of colinearity 
between wage rates in adjacent quarters produced rather jagged lag 
structures. The sum of coefficients for all lagged values of a variable is a 
more stable parameter than sums for only part of the estimated lag 
structure. 
Our focus is on the NJTC variable, however. Most of the coefficients 
are positive. In the relative input price model, we may reject at the .05 
level or better the hypothesis that NJTC has had zero or negative effects 
on employment for the construction industry and the industry subaggre-
gates for apparel, food, furniture, and other retailing. In the nominal 
input price model, statistically significant, positive coefficients on the 
NJTC variables are obtained for eating and drinking places and for other 
retailing. Tables 7.3 and 7.6 summarize the sensitivity of the NJTC 
coefficient to reductions in the length of the lags on all variables. At the 
bottom of these tables we sum the effects implied by each industry 
equation across industries, to obtain for March 1978 a total effect for the 
industries studied. For the relative wage model, the estimates of employ-
ment stimulus are 470,000 for the preferred three-year lag. In the nomi-
nal input price model of table 7.6, estimates of employment stimulus 
range between 225,000 and 585,000. During this period employment rose 
1,140,000 in these industries and roughly 3,800,000 in the nation as a 
whole. These results are consistent with the observation that between 
1977:11 and 1978:11 rates of employment growth in both construction and 
retailing substantially exceeded the rates of output growth. For example, 
while the growth rate of construction put in place was 4.5 percent over 
this period, the growth rate of employment was 8.2-9.9 percent and that 
of man-hours was 10.4 percent. Even in retailing, where cyclical increases 
in sales are typically handled without hiring extra workers, employment 
growth—3.4 percent in household data and 4.0 percent in establishment 
data—outpaced the 3.0 percent growth of deflated retail sales. 
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Table 7.7 Impact of NJTC on Hours Worked per Week in Construction and 































































































































Note: Derivation of these series is described in the appendix. 
Underneath the NJTC coefficient is first the /-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no 
effect and then the standard error of the regression (in parentheses). 
•64-78:03 
Significance levels ** .01 ^ p * .05>/?>.01 
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Hours 
Table 7.7 present^ coefficients on NJTC in regressions predicting the 
log of hours worked per week. Coefficients are consistently negative in 
retailing. Statistically significant negative coefficients are obtained for the 
retail aggregate and for food, furniture, and general merchandising. The 
coefficient in the construction hours equation may be biased by simul-
taneity. The man-hours 2SLS regression reported in table 7.5 has a 
considerably smaller coefficient than the corresponding employment 
equation. When one takes into account the reduction in average hours 
worked per week that the New Jobs Tax Credit seems to be producing in 
the retail sector, the percentage increase in man-hours worked is likely to 
be only half the percentage increase in employment. 
7.6.2 Retail Price Models 
In competitive industries like those studied, reduced marginal costs 
imply reduced prices. To test this relationship, the monthly rate of 
change of the retail price was regressed on current and lagged changes in 
a number of industry cost variables—wage rates; wholesale price of the 
product; the price of materials, services, and energy consumed by the 
distribution sector; the rental price of capital; and excise taxes—as well as 
on the unemployment rate, seasonal dummies, and trends on the season-
al dummies. The sums of the coefficients on the input price terms re-
ported in columns 5-8 of table 7.8 have a pattern that is reasonable. The 
restaurant and tavern industry has the largest wage coefficients, and the 
elasticity of retail price with respect to the wage rate is approximately 
equal to the share of distribution sector labor compensation in the total 
costs of the industry. In retail sectors where payroll is a smaller (10%-
20%) share of total costs, the sum of the wage coefficients is smaller. The 
elasticity of the retail price with respect to wholesale prices of the goods 
being sold is high in sectors with low retail markups (food) and lower in 
sectors with high markups (furniture). The impact of the rental cost of the 
plant and equipment used by the distribution sector is uniformly low. The 
coefficients on the price of energy, materials, and business services do not 
seem to follow any pattern. 
The coefficient on CONTROLS measures the response of the yearly 
rate of change of prices to the eighteen-month period of controls running 
from August 1971 to January 1973. When price controls are phased out, 
retail margins should return to their former level, so the CONTROLS 
variable becomes midly negative during Nixon's phase 3 (1973) and more 
strongly negative during phase 4 (1974). Although most of the coef-
ficients are not statistically significant, it is certainly remarkable that they 
are all negative. The statistically significant coefficient in the food away 
from home regression suggests that the controls may have succeeded in 
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compressing the margins of companies like MacDonald's and Denny's. A 
rising unemployment rate also seems to compress retail sector margins. 
The unemployment variable is the average monthly proportionate rate of 
increase or decrease in the unemployment rate of prime-age males over 
the previous 6-9 months. The coefficients imply that a doubling of the 
unemployment rate compresses the retail margins of furniture by .8 
percentage points and of food away from home by 1.1 percentage points. 
Estimates of the impact of NJTC on retail margins in our preferred 
model are given in column 1 of table 7.8. Table 7.9 reports the NJTC 
coefficients, the standard errors of the coefficient, and the regression 
standard error for alternative specifications of the model. The NJTC 
variable in the price change equations is the first difference of the NJTC 
variable used in the unemployment and hours equations. Column 2 
presents the coefficients for a model which excludes the price of consum-
able inputs and business services. Column 3 presents the results when 
there are no trends on the seasonal dummies. Column 4 presents the 
results for a model which restricts lags to six months. Beginning in 
January 1978 there was a rapid escalation of food prices. Column 5 
presents estimates which exclude this period and which therefore mea-
sure NJTC's impact during the first eight months. For nonfood commod-
ities and restaurant meals, the retail trade margin is negatively and 
significantly related to the timing of NJTC knowledge. Between May 
1977 and June 1978 nonfood commodity retail prices rose 4.73 percent 
while wholesale prices of nonfood, consumer finished goods were rising 
by 6.56 percent. This discrepancy of 1.83 percentage points is quite close 
to the NJTC effect of 2.2 percent (.038 x .572 x 100) estimated by the 
preferred model (column 1). The observed decline in the margin is 
particularly surprising given recent increases in the relative price of 
imported consumer goods. (Imported products, it should be noted, are 
included in retail but not wholesale price indexes.) 
The payroll of the distribution sector is less than twenty percent of the 
retail price of the commodities sold to consumers. Only in the restaurant 
and tavern industry does payroll approach thirty percent. Consequently, 
there is only a limited amount of room for reductions in prices in response 
to a subsidy of payroll costs. 
Among the subsectors, the pattern of coefficients is consistent with a 
priori expectations. For example, the large negative NJTC coefficients in 
the restaurant industry equation suggest that in this low skill, intensive 
sector the 8%-12% policy-induced reduction in marginal costs resulted in 
a 1.1 percent decline in output price during the twelve-month period. 
Estimates for moderately wage intensive retail industries (apparel, furni-
ture) indicate that the 5%-7% reduction in marginal costs induced here is 
associated with a smaller .5 percent reduction in prices over the period. In 
contrast, the small-margin, non-wage-intensive retail food industry has a 
Table 7.8 Equations Predicting the Rate of Change of Retail Prices of Commodities 
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.122 .137 .0017 0 1.87 .723 
.040 .044 .0020 0 1.88 .755 
.075 - .005 .0029 0 1.93 .841 
.306 .102 .0015 .41 1.79 .559 
.509 - .044 .0054 0 2.51 .700 
.004 -.035 .0002 0 2.23 .733 
Note: Derivation of these series is described in the appendix. 
The price index for commodities excluded prices of owner-occupied housing. In the disaggregated equations (1,3,4, and 5) the coefficient on the state and 
local excise tax rates was constrained to be 1. The sales tac variable in the equation for all commodities and nonfood commodities includes federal excise 
taxes. 
All models were estimated for 53:03-78:06 except Furniture, which was estimated for 58:03-78:06. Standard errors are located in parentheses underneath 
variables that do not have freely estimated lag structures. 
Significance levels ** .01>/? * . 0 5 > p > . 0 1 
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.044 .0054 0 2.51 .700 
.035 .0002 0 2.23 .733 
Note: Derivation of these series is described in the appendix. 
The price index for commodities excluded prices of owner-occupied housing. In the disaggregated equations (1,3,4, and 5) the coefficient on the state and 
local excise tax rates was constrained to be 1. The sales tac variable in the equation for all commodities and nonfood commodities includes federal excise 
taxes. 
All models were estimated for 53:03-78:06 except Furniture, which was estimated for 58:03-78:06. Standard errors are located in parentheses underneath 
variables that do not have freely estimated lag structures. 
Significance levels ** .01 >p * .05>p> .01 
Table 7.9 Impact of NJTC on the Margin between Retail and Wholesale Prices under Alternative Models 
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Note: Derivation of these series is described in the appendix. 
The standard error of the coefficient and the regression are located beneath the coefficient. Models 1-4 estimated on monthly data 1953:03 to 1978:06. For 
model 5, sample period ends 1978:01. Weights for Q are based on the 1967 input-output table, which includes gasoline, electricity, telephones, containers, 
cellophane packaging, supplies, insurance, auto repair, and legal fees. 
Significance levels ** .01 >p * .05>p>0.1 
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nonsignificant positive coefficient, reflecting the fact that incremental 
employment in this sector tends to contribute more to the quality than to 
the volume of output. 
The final rows of table 7.9 indicate the reduction of consumer costs due 
to NJTC-induced compression of the distribution margin implied by the 
equations. The estimated cost savings of $1.9-$3.6 billion in the first 
twelve months after passage of the credit can be compared with total 
NJTC claims of $2.4 billion in 1977 and $4.5 billion in 1978. 
7.7 Caveats and a Research Agenda 
This study finds considerable evidence for the hypothesis that in the 
construction and distribution industries NJTC had the effects on employ-
ment, hours worked per week, and prices that would be predicted by 
economic theory. The point estimates of the size of these effects— 
400,000 extra jobs in construction and distribution and one percentage 
point reduction in the margin between retail and wholesale prices of 
commodities—seem to imply that the program succeeded in achieving 
some of its goals. 
Our findings must be viewed as preliminary, however, for they are 
based on only twelve months of experience with the program and on 
outcomes in industries that employ only thirty-five percent of all private 
nonagricultural workers. Perhaps the NJTC variable is capturing other 
exogenous forces that are inducing contemporaneous employment in-
creases and price decreases in the sectors studied. And, if that is the case, 
perhaps improved specifications would reduce the impacts attributed 
here to NJTC. Longer or shorter lags, adding the price of energy, or 
assuming a once-and-for-all shift in the time trend during 1974, do not, 
however, cause major reductions in the NJTC coefficients. There may, 
nevertheless, be other factors at work, and the conclusion that NJTC is 
having major effects on employment and prices must remain tentative 
until better data or more periods of observation become available. 
Further evidence on the impact of NJTC can be obtained by studying a 
greater variety of industries. The cap on the credit means that industries 
dominated by large firms—e.g., aluminum, metal mining, autos, insur-
ance—do not receive significant benefits. NJTC should either leave em-
ployment in these industries undisturbed or cause them to lose workers to 
the more favored industries. Examining the employment and pricing 
behavior of these industries would thus simultaneously sharpen our tests 
of NJTC's impact and measure any across-industry displacements that 
may be occurring. Good price, wage rate, and output data are essential if 
the methodology used in this paper is to be applied to other industries. 
The necessary data are available for mining, manufacturing, transporta-
tion, and ultilities, and studies of these industries should be high on the 
research agenda. 
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This paper has not attempted to measure the effects of NJTC on output 
or wage rates. The efficacy of marginal wage subsidies cannot be evalu-
ated, however, without knowing how they influence output and wage 
rates. One of the primary arguments for marginal wage subsidies is that 
they can induce an employment expansion while simultaneously putting 
downward pressure on prices. If, however, they induce wage increases 
and most of the inertia in the wage-price spiral is wages chasing wages, 
NJTC could cause the underlying rate of inflation to accelerate rather 
than decelerate. Three types of issues must be investigated: (1) What is 
the impact effect of NJTC on the wage rates of industries that benefit 
from the credit? (2) Does the impact effect observed in these industries 
induce catch-up wage increases in other industries? and (3) Do the wage 
adjustments induced by NJTC accelerate the underlying rate of wage 
inflation or are they once and for all shifts of relative wage rates? 
Output effects are also extremely important, for if the total economy's 
real output has not increased, aggregate social welfare will almost cer-
tainly have declined. Empirical studies of NJTC output effects will be 
difficult to do, however. In most industries the output measures available 
do a very poor job of capturing changes in quality or service mix. 
Measures of the quantity of other factor inputs used are also generally 
unavailable. Under these circumstances it is hard to envision how it will 
be possible to make definitive statements about wage subsidy impacts on 
total factor productivity. In the retail industry, for instance, the extra 
workers hired because of a wage subsidy might carry packages to a 
customer's car, contact delinquent credit customers more quickly, take 
inventory or clean the store more frequently, substitute for deliverymen 
as arrangers of product displays, or allow the store to remain open longer 
hours. None of these responses will raise total sales of the retail sector. 
Nevertheless, the extra workers have allowed the firm either to reduce 
other costs or to improve the quality of the service provided. The data 
limitations mean that results of any studies of productivity impacts will 
have to be interpreted cautiously. 
Making wage rates and output endogenous is desirable for still another 
reason. The models we have used to estimate the impact of NJTC take 
output and wage rates as given. If NJTC raises output, our measure of its 
employment effect will understate the true impact. To the extent that 
NJTC raises wage rates and wage rates have a negative short-run impact 
on employment, our measure of employment effects will overstate the 
true impact. 
Research is also needed on (1) the sensitivity of wage subsidy impacts 
to the stage of the business cycle; (2) the optimal timing of the initiation 
and cancellation of such a subsidy; and (3) the long-term response of 
business to a predictable countercyclical manipulation of this policy 
instrument. Temporary programs have a way of becoming permanent, so 
it is important to understand how the response of firms and the economy 
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will change if the program becomes permanent. The temporary nature of 
NJTC certainly reduced employer awareness of and responses to it. If a 
marginal wage subsidy were permanent, this program would eventually 
disappear. On the other hand, a permanent credit would not induce firms 
to build up inventories, as NJTC may have done. If, in a permanent 
marginal NJTC, the threshold of eligibility were revised periodically to 
reflect more recent employment experience, raising current employment 
would reduce the future expected subsidy, thus inducing a smaller re-
sponse (Bishop and Wilson 1980). 
Appendix 
Calculation of Rental Price of Capital Indexes 
The rental price of capital services for the fth industry is given by: 
Ri = Pl ki 
^(l-UZ-k+Uzk')
 {bi + r_ped 
Pki = price of investment goods used by the ith industry 
TP = property tax rate on business property 
u-effective tax rate on business income (depends upon 
form of organization) 
z = present value of depreciation deductions 
k = statutory rate of the investment tax credit 
k' = statutory rate of the investment tax credit during the 
period of the Long amendment, when firms were re-
quired to subtract the investment tax credit from their 
depreciation base 
8 = rate of replacement 
r=nominal rate of return 
Pli = expected rate of price appreciation of capital goods 
This formula was separately applied to the corporate and noncorporate 
business sector. The share of corporate business in each of our industries 
was estimated from the 1967 Statistics of Income by calculating the share 
of the total business receipts of proprietorships, partnerships, and cor-
porations in the industry that went to corporations with more than 
$25,000 in profits. This share is 75 percent in wholesaling, 66 percent in 
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to corporations with more than 
sent in wholesaling, 66 percent in 
retailing, 47 percent in eating and drinking places, and 72 percent in 
trucking. The business receipt ratio of 68 percent for construction was 
adjusted to 60 percent to reflect the greater importance of subcontracted 
work in large, corporately held construction firms. 
The rental price used in the equations is a composite of rental prices for 
structures and for equipment. Estimates of gross stocks of plant and 
equipment for each industry were taken from Fawcett's "Development of 
Capital Stock Services by Industry Sector." Updates of the time series of 
effective tax rates and present values of depreciation deductions for 
nonresidential structures published in Christensen and Jorgenson (1973) 
were graciously provided by L. Christensen. 
For each period, 1947-54, 1954-62, 1962-71, 1971-78, separate pres-
ent values of depreciation deductions were calculated for four types of 
trucks, two types of construction equipment, two types of office and 
business equipment, and office furniture. It was assumed that between 
1954 and 1962, twenty percent of new investment continued to be depre-
ciated by straight line methods. Since January 1, 1959, small businesses 
have been able to write off immediately twenty percent of the value of 
new investments in equipment with a tax life of six or more years. It was 
assumed that lack of knowledge and the $4,000 cap per joint return 
caused only half the proprietorships and partnerships to claim this deduc-
tion, and the present values of office furniture and business equipment 
depreciation deductions were adjusted accordingly. The timing of 
changes in depreciation policy was taken to be the date of announcement 
for the administrative liberalizations of 1962 and 1971 and the date of 
enactment for legislated changes. Effective rates of property taxation 
were taken from Christensen and Jorgenson (1979). 
The seven percent investment tax credit was part of the revenue act 
which became law October 16,1962. The date of the Long amendment's 
repeal was February 26,1964. As an antiinflationary measure, the credit 
was suspended from October 10,1966, to March 1967, and from April 19, 
1969, to August 15,1971. The period of the Long amendment is therefore 
taken to be 1962:11 through 1964:02. The periods of suspension are 
defined as 1966:10 through 1967:02 and 1969:05 through 1971:07. The 
value of the tax credit was raised to ten percent by the tax reduction act 
enacted on March 29,1975. Bischoff has recommended that the effective 
rate of the investment tax credit be adjusted downward to reflect the 
lower rate available on short-lived equipment and on equipment pur-
chased by utilities. Our assumptions are that for fixed producers' durable 
equipment, retail and wholesale industries were eligible for 6/7 of the 
statutory rate of the credit. Corporations were assumed to receive a tax 
credit of 3/7 of the statutory rate for trucks and 4/7 of the statutory rate for 
construction equipment. Because proprietorships and small corporations 
face lower marginal tax rates, they will prefer the higher tax credit that 
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they receive for reporting a five-year lifetime for trucks and equipment to 
the speedier depreciation deductions that a three-year lifetime provides. 
This option is provided by the Asset Depreciation Range System; we 
assume that such firms exercise it, and we adjust the value of depreciation 
deductions and the investment tax credit (2/3 of the statutory rate) to 
reflect it. 
We assume that real, after-tax rates of return (nominal after-tax re-
turns minus expected capital gains on plant and equipment) are equated 
across industries, and are constant over time. The average of the after-
tax, real rates of return given in Christensen and Jorgenson (1979) for 
1947 through 1969 is five percent for corporations and 4.8 percent for 
noncorporate business. We adopt five percent as our assumed real rate of 
return. 
Price indexes for nonresidential structures were obtained from the 
Data Resources Data Bank. Wholesale price indexes for trucks were 
adjusted for the federal excise tax and used as the price index for trucking 
equipment. The wholesale price index for construction equipment was 
used in construction. The price index for nontransport producers' du-
rable equipment in wholesale and retail industries is an average of 
wholesale price indexes adjusted for state and federal excise tax changes. 
The components of this are office and store machines equipment 
(wt= .30), office furniture (wt= 35)T and general purpose machinery 
(wt = .35). For retailing, replacement rates of .044 for plant and .157 for 
nontransport equipment were provided by Gollop and Jorgenson. Re-
placement rates for trucks and construction equipment were .32 and 
.2858, respectively. 
In both 1963 and 1967, forty-one percent of the retail and wholesale 
industry's purchases of new equipment were from the motor vehicles and 
equipment industry. The replacement rate for trucks is^  twice that of other 
nontransport producers' durable equipment. Using this fact we calculate 
motor vehicles to be 25.8 percent of the industry's stock of equipment. 
Notes 
1. For instance the vector W=(Wt, Wq, Wq_3, W*_6, W<L9, W*_12, W*_18, W.2A, W*_30) 
3 W • 6 W 
where W« = 2 - ^ and W* = 2 - ^ 
i = i 3 / = i 6 
The one exception is that the sales variable specific to the industry whose employment is 
being predicted has the first three months of the lag structure entering individually rather 
than as a quarterly average. 
2. R = (R, R-12,R-24,R-36) where R = 2 — 
i = i
 1 2 
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3. V. Smith (1963) has shown that investment incentives when there is no taxation of 
business income are identical to those prevailing when investment is experienced in the first 
year. 
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